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T h e objective  o f  th is  p ap er is to  reveal h o w  R u s s ia 's  soft p o w er is fram ed  in  th e P olish  
officia l and exp ert d iscou rses. D eb ates arou n d  th e  term , as w ell as relevan ce o f  th e  “ con text in  
w h ich  th e relation sh ip  ex ists,”1 th at p rom in en t U. S. sch olar an d  statesm an  J o sep h  N ye w h o  
co in ed  th e  term  ‘soft p o w er’ a cou p le  d ecades ago p a rticu larly  in sists on, an d  articu lated  p ro b ­
lem s to  p in  d ow n  th is k in d  o f  p o w er2 m ake m e co n sid er th e  su b ject-m atter w ith in  a b road er 
con text o f  R u s s ia 's  foreign  p o licy  in her ‘n ear ab road ’ / R u ssia-E U  ‘com m on  n e ig h b o u rh o od ’.
Why Poland? T h is co u n try  w as o ften  co n sid ered  as a R u ssian  rival in  th e sp ace cu rren t­
ly  term ed  as ‘n ear ab road ’, ‘th e region  o f  C IS ’ or ‘com m on  n e ig h b o u rh o o d ’3 -  th is th in k in g  dates 
b a ck  to  th e  tim es o f  th e  P o lish -L ith u an ian  C om m on w ealth . A s  an E U  m em b er-state, P olan d  
stresses h er ro le  o f  a p o licy-m a k er in  regard  to  th e  E U  E astern  n eigh b ou rs and she, m an y  sch o l­
ars rig h tly  p o in t out, is quite su ccessfu l in  it. A t th e sam e tim e P olan d  has been , p rob ab ly, the 
m ost active am o n g th e  E U  m em b er-states o f  C en tral an d  E astern  E u rop e in  raisin g  aw aren ess 
in  th e  E u ro p ean  U nion , and  also  across th e A tlan tic, about d ifferen t asp ects o f  in secu ri­
ty/d an ge r co n n ected  w ith  R ussia. So h er active p o sition  on regio n -m ak in g  an d  th e h isto rica lly  
em b ed d ed  p ercep tio n  o f  a d an ger from  th e  east m ake h er scru tin ize  c lo se ly  th e d evelo p m en ts in  
th e E astern  n e ig h b o u rh o od  and  com e up  w ith  h er tak e  on p o licy  solutions.
In  m y  opinion , it is fru itfu l to  lo o k  at th e P olish  u n d erstan d in g  o f  R u s s ia 's  soft pow er 
an d  its assessm en t (e. g. h o w  th e  stru ctu re o f  R u s s ia 's  soft p o w er arsenal, p articu lar m ech a ­
nism s o f  h er in flu en ce an d  attraction  are seen), as w ell as h er role in  th e region , b ecau se  th is 
k in d  o f  research  m igh t:
-  help u n d erstan d  th e  p ecu liarities o f  R u s s ia 's  soft p o w er an d  h o w  it w orks, i f  it does;
-  g iven  th e  recen t tre n d  o f  th e  R u ssian -P o lish  recon ciliation , reveal w h eth er th e P o lish  a u th o ri­
ties and  experts see a room  fo r m ore tru st an d  co op eration  in  th e  n eigh bou rh ood ;
* The paper is prepared with the support o f the European Studies Institute at MGIMO-University (research grant).
The Editor: the article was written in early autumn 2013, therefore, the political crisis in Ukraine which 
started in November 2013 is not covered in the paper. It is worth noting that the variant o f how the European Union 
and Russia should constructively develop their relations in regard to the situation in Ukraine and, broader, the clashed 
integration projects which is now (January 2014) being discussed by the EU authorities (and especially prom oted by 
Germany) was, according to the author, among the solutions suggested by Polish experts in September 2013.
1 Nye, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in W orld Politics. N ew York, 2004. P. 2.
2 For an outline o f problems with soft power measurement see, for example: Radikov I., Leksyutina Ya. “Mi- 
agkaia sila” kak sovremennyi atribut velikoi derzhavy / / Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia. No. 2. 
February 2012. Pp. 19-26.
3 I shall em ploy prim arily the term  ‘near abroad’ originated in Russia, as it highlights the peculiarity o f Rus­
s ia 's  approach and is widely used in policy analyses and public narrative, though the term  has been removed from  the 
Russian official discourse (see details in: Shishkina O. V. Vneshnepoliticheskie resursy: Rossiya i ES na prostranstve 
“obshchego sosedstva”. Moscow, 2013. P. 19). The ‘region of CIS’ is m ainly characteristic o f the academic discourse. At 
the same time I shall use ‘near abroad’, region/area of CIS’ and ‘common neighbourhood’ coined in the EU as inter­
changeable (when the context allows). Besides, I use the term  ‘soft power’ without quotation marks in English follow­
ing the established practice.
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-  highlight what the Polish officials and experts think about Russia and her prospects and also 
about some other key countries in the post-Soviet space (e. g. Ukraine).
In terms of methodology I draw on adaptations of the discourse analysis to foreign poli­
cy and Europeanization studies by the Danish scholars Henrik Larsen and Kennet Lyngaard. 
Thus, discourses create a certain ‘space of possibility’ for decision-makers which is both con­
straining and enabling, this is the basis on which policy preferences, interests and goals are con- 
structed4. The ideas of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe who stress incomplete character of 
any social totality (including identity) are also relevant5.
The chronological period for analysis -  the years of 2009-2013. To be more precise, 
from inaugurating the Eastern Partnership (EaP), then the first significant Poland's say in the 
EU neighbourhood policy (together with Sweden), in May 2009 to the present (September 
2013), when the “milestone” Vilnius EaP summit is due in late November and the renewed in­
frastructure of the Russian-Polish relations started to work, including the Centers for Dialogue 
and Understanding in both countries.
Primary texts: Poland's official documentation related to foreign policy; on-line open- 
access analytic material of the Polish Institute of International Relations -  a think tank which 
closely cooperates with Poland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the same time opinions ex­
pressed by its experts might also give a broader picture of possibilities.
1. A  note on Russia's soft power
Much has already been said about R ussia's potential in developing soft power by both 
domestic and foreign experts, and here I would like to highlight a few points in the discussions.
It has become a commonplace to argue that Russia does not possess proper resources to 
become a successful player in this field, primarily because her socio-political model can hardly be 
called attractive -  in fact, a key prerequisite according to the well-known definition by Joseph 
Nye6. It is worth noting that Nye himself clearly joined the debate with his 2013 article in “Foreign 
Policy” stressing that this was what Russia, as well as China, “don 't get about soft power”7. How­
ever, it does not seem to hamper Russia's (and China's) endeavors on this way. They rather tend 
to come up with their adapted definitions of the term, which also imply that developing soft power 
capabilities is considered as a certain response to a “Western intervention”8.
From the second half of 2000s there have been visible efforts of the state to increase 
Russia's institutional capacities in this sphere: e. g. NGO “Russkii Mir,” aimed primarily at the 
support of compatriots who live abroad, and the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation with 
offices in New York and Paris were established in 20079; agency “Rossotrudnichestvo” was 
founded in 2008, new public diplomacy institutions, the A. M. Gorchakov Foundation and the 
Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), were created a couple of years later, etc. 10 Finally, 
the commitment to develop R ussia's soft power potential came to the programmatic docu­
ments, as the 2013 edition of Russia's Foreign Policy Concept clearly indicates. One might re­
gard it as a certain success of the Russian conduct in this field that recently, while some scholars
4 See, for example: Larsen H. British and Danish European Policy in the 1990s: A Discourse Approach / / Eu­
ropean Journal of International Relations. 1999. No. 4. P. 453.
5 Torfing, Jacob. New Theories of Discourse. Oxford, 1999. Pp. 6-7.
6 “Soft power is not merely the same as influence ... It is also the ability to attract...”. “The soft power of the 
country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values 
(where it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having 
moral authority)”. See: Nye, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. P. 6, 11.
7 Nye, Joseph. What Russia and China Don't Get about Soft Power / / Foreign Policy.29 April 2013. Availbale 
at: http://www. foreignpolicy. com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power; 
Simons, Greg. Russian Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Structure, Means and Message. Paper prepared for the 
conference “Russia and the World” (Helsinki, 23-24 October 2013). P. 6. I am grateful to the author for sharing the 
paper with me.
8 Kosachev, Konstantin. The Specifics of Russian Soft Power // Russia in Global Affairs. 7 October 2012. 
Available at: http://eng. globalaffairs. ru/number/The-Specifics-of-Russian-Soft-Power-15683; Makarychev, Andrey. 
Hard Questions about Soft Power: A Normative Outlook at Russia's Foreign Policy. DGAPanalyse kompakt. Nr 7. Oc­
tober 2011. P. 3.
9 IDC's main objective is to monitor the situation with human rights in Western Europe and the U. S.; its 
branches'web-sites: http://www. indemco. org/; http://www. idc-europe. org/
10 See in more detail in: Lebedeva M. M. Sotsial'no-gumanitarnoe izmerenie mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii v 
ATR // Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. 2013. No. 1. Pp. 6-7.
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keep avoiding application of the term ‘soft power’ to Russia,11 quite a few researchers tend to 
define as soft power a pretty wide range of Russia's policies, not exactly in line with its classical 
understanding12. It certainly should also be attributed to the concept's spreading all over the 
world, but what is important is that Russia has become a legitimate player in this field.
Russia's efforts and the definition of ‘soft power’ in the 2013 Concept highlight that Russia 
borrowed a part of N ye's concept combining it with reasonable Soviet practices, as the Russian ex­
pert, Editor in Chief of “Russia in Global Affairs” journal, Fedor Lukyanov stresses13. At the same 
time he and some other scholars point to Russia's accentuated pragmatism and, of course, less re­
sources available which make it difficult to extract the fruits the Soviet Union was able to ripe.
While there are definitely different addressees of this country's soft power policy, these ac­
tivities are first of all aimed at her diverse ‘near abroad’14. The underlying assumption of Russia's 
various policies, including that of soft power, in CIS area is well rendered by Igor Torbakov: “accord­
ing to the Kremlin's geopolitical outlook, Russia can successfully compete globally with the United 
States, China or the European Union only if it acts as a leader of the regional bloc”15. Here it is also 
relevant that Russia's pragmatic understanding of soft power, with the stress on its understanding 
as power, is highlighted by the specified negative effects (e. g. in the 2013 Foreign Policy Concept) 
when it is employed by other actors. This approach cannot be very operational for the Russian au­
thorities in persuading CIS neighbours about the intended common good with no harm to their sov­
ereignty and at the same time does not imply particular care about how Russia's activities in her 
‘near abroad’ might be seen by the other, external, actors in the region -  the reason is likely to be 
this country's position of the insider in the post-Soviet area giving her some kind of monopoly16. 
Yet, it is worth noting that ‘near abroad’ countries attach much importance to balancing between 
different actors as a way of maintaining their independence.
Over her soft power channels, Russia is keen to deliver her CIS neighbours a message that 
she does not have imperial designs, and the promoted integration schemes do serve the purpose of 
modernization of all the parties involved which is far from easy against this backdrop17. At the same 
time the latest integration project, the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia in effect 
from 2010 (and the associated project of the Common Economic Space was launched in 2012),18 
definitely demonstrates that Russia is able to learn -  with all its drawbacks it is a forward-looking 
initiative with efforts to establish real integration, that is, a qualitatively new policy. As such, it has 
become a challenge for the EU in its Eastern neighbourhood policies.
2. Russia's ‘near abroad’ or ‘common neighbourhood’: regionalization o f the space
To get a better understanding of Poland's policies and approaches in ‘common neigh­
bourhood’, it is worth looking first at how this space is regionalized.
Except ‘common neighbourhood’, the region is conceptualized as a part of ‘New Eastern 
Europe’ with Russia being the other part of it. The name is identical to the proto-region concept 
which came up as a result of the Group on Difficult Matters Resulting from History of the Rus- 
sian-Polish Relations's work19. Peculiarity of the latter is that both Russia and Poland are inte­
gral parts of it. Former PISM director, Stanislaw Debski, is a member of the team promoting the
11 As, for instance, a British scholar James Sherr in his book “Hard Diplomacy and Soft Coercion: Russia's 
Influence Abroad” published in 2013. Information about the book is available at: http://www. chathamhouse. 
org/publications/books/archive/view/191955
12 See, for instance: Dragneva, Rilka and Wolczuk, Kataryna. Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the 
EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or Rivalry? Russia and Eurasia Programme policy brief. August 2012. P. 2.
13 Lukyanov, Fedor. Depardieu protiv progressa. January 2013. Available at: http://www. gazeta. 
ru/column/lukyanov/4929549. shtml
14 Makarychev, Andrey. Hard Questions about Soft Power: A Normative Outlook at Russia's Foreign Policy. 
DGAPanalyse kompakt. Nr 7. October 2011. P. 5.
15 Torbakov, Igor. The “Eurasian” Orientation and its Discontents: A Note on the Debates over Russia's In­
ternational Identity and National Interest. Paper prepared for the conference “Russia and the World” (Helsinki, 23-24 
October 2013). P. 8. I am grateful to the author for sharing the paper with me.
16 Makarychev, Andrey. Regionalism and Identities in the Common Neighbourhood: European and Russian 
Discourses. CEURUS EU-Russia Papers. No. 10. October 2013.
17 See, for example: Kosachev, Kostantin. The Specifics of Russian Soft Power.
18 I shall talk about the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, as most debates in the neighbour­
hood (first of all Ukraine's choice) develop around it, and hereinafter shall mention it as the Customs Union.
19 It is being studied by the Russian scholars based at MGIMO-University, which is especially involved into 
the Group's activities, in cooperation mostly with Polish, Ukrainian and Byelorussian researchers.
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research  p roject b a se d  on th is con cep t an d  its resu lts20. M ean w h ile , it is u n lik e ly  th at th is u n ­
d erstan d in g  m igh t soon  b eco m e a p art o f  th e P olish  d om estic  d iscou rses. P o la n d 's  auth orities 
an d  exp erts co n sid er ‘N e w  E astern  E u ro p e ’ as th e cou n tries on th e  eastern  b o rd er o f  P olan d  
and, b road er, o f  th e  p o st-S o viet space, excep t th e  B a ltic  states, -  in  fact, th e targ et aud ien ce o f 
th e tra n sfo rm a tio n  exp erien ce from  ‘o ld ’ E astern  E u rop e w h ich  n ow ad ays strives to  id e n tify  it ­
s e lf  as C en tra l E u rope. T h is m ean in g  is im p lied  in  th e o fficia l and  exp ert d iscou rses an d  is re p ­
resen ted, fo r  exam p le, b y  a re la tive ly  n ew  an d  d yn am ic jo u rn a l p ro ject b earin g  th e  sam e nam e, 
‘N e w  E astern  E u ro p e,’ w h ich  is b ase d  in  K rakow . T h e jo u rn a l is fu n d ed  inter alia b y  P o la n d 's  
M in istry  o f  In tern ation al A ffa irs  and serves also as a v en u e fo r P ISM  ex p erts21.
W ith  th e  in ten sified  E U -R u ssia  in tegratio n  p ro je c ts ' co m p etitio n  in  ‘n ear ab road ’/ 
‘com m on  n e ig h b o u rh o o d ’ th e region  is in crea sin g ly  p erceiv ed  as u n even . O ne can  see tw o  logics 
p resen t -  tran sfo rm atio n al an d  p rag m atic  (geop olitics-, secu rity- an d  eco n o m y-cen tered ). T h e 
first one has b eco m e esp ecia lly  relevan t on th e eve o f  th e V iln iu s E aP  su m m it to  b e  h eld  in  late 
N o ve m b er 2013 -  not o n ly  v ia b ility  o f  P o la n d 's  role in  E U  policy, b u t also th at o f  th e  E U  as a 
n orm ative p o w er is co n sid ered  to  b e at stake th ere . Its sign ifican ce can  also  b e  h igh ligh ted , for 
exam p le, b y  th e P o lish  e x p e rts ' ta lk  about th e E U  dou b le  stan d ard s in  M old ova, th e critical 
co u n try  in  term s o f  th e E u rop ean  U n io n 's  n o rm ative p o w er success, in  ord er to  su p p ort the 
E U -sp on so red  m od ern ization  p a th 22. So fo r  P o lan d  it is p ivo tal to  set th e p riorities right. N o n - 
E U  E astern  E u rop e is on th e  top  o f  th e  agen da: d ifferen t op in ion s about w h at co u n try  is the 
m ost sign ifican t -  M old ova  as th e  m ost su ccessfu l in  tran sfo rm atio n  or m ore strateg ica lly  im ­
p ortan t U krain e m akin g  an im p ortan t ch oice. In terestin gly , B elaru s has b een  receivin g  m ore 
a tten tio n  in  th is d iscou rse w ith  th e im p licatio n  th at sh e is th e one p ron e to  th e tran sfo rm atio n  
in flu en ce d ue to  th e u rgen t n e cessity  o f  stru ctu ral re fo rm s23. S ou th  C au casu s as su ch  is g iven  
less priority , o n ly  G eorgia  is pu t fo rw ard  as an excep tion al case -  she is m o stly  b e in g  rated  se­
con d  in  her tran sfo rm atio n  efforts am o n g E aP 24. P robably, th e  reasons are P o la n d 's  lim ited  
po ssib ilities to  m ake a d ifferen ce here, as w ell as o verall adm ittan ce o f  little  E U  leverage  in  th is  
area  (w ith  d isap p oin tin g  A r m e n ia 's  ch oice  and rath er in d ifferen t A zerb aijan ). P ISM  experts 
con clu d e th at it does m ake sen se to  d istin gu ish  am on g th e ir  n eigh bou rs, and, th erefo re , to  d e ­
ve lo p  a tw o -sp eed  P artn ersh ip 25. A t th e sam e tim e C en tral A sia , not in clu d e d  in  E aP, is d efin ite­
ly  gettin g  m ore a tten tio n  as an im p ortan t su b-region , or region -in -th e-m ak in g, on th e p o st­
Soviet space. T ran sfo rm atio n  lo g ics here give w a y  to  g eop olitica l, se cu rity  an d  eco n o m ic co n sid ­
eration s w ith  p a rticu lar  stress on K azak h stan  w h ich  is seen  as a va lu ab le  p oten tia l eco n o m ic 
partn er. O ne can  also  reveal a lo o k  at p o ssib ilities o f  th e m ore E U  p o litica l en gagem en t w ith  a t­
ten tio n  to  K a z a k h s ta n 's  (as w ell as B e la ru s 's  in  o th er su b -region ) m oves aim ed  at her in crea s­
in g  in d ep en d en ce  fro m  R u ssia26.
W hile in  previous years one can discern P o la n d 's  disappointm ent in the V isegrad G roup 
(V4 ) form at both  w ith in  the E U  and in  her Eastern policy, in  the last tw o years this regional forum , 
borrow ing A n d rey  M ak a rych e v 's  term , reactualized27. W ith  a few  V 4  successes in  the EU  politics 
(energy security, E U  funding, distinct contribution to  hard security), Poland, now  its recognized 
leader, increased her reliance on this regional group. She strives to unite her V isegrad  G roup part­
ners over the Eastern policy for V 4  to becom e tru ly  an E U  bridge to  the Eastern neighbourhood, to
20 Here I mean ‘Vostochnaya Evropa. Perspectivy’ journal's editorial board (web-site: www. newprospects. 
ru) and, after the journal ceased functioning in 2012, the RIAC projects dealing with the proto-region in question.
21 See, for example: Sasztowt K. Russia's Policy towards Armenia: Big Stick and Small Carrot // New Eastern 
Europe. 5 Sept. 2013. www. neweasterneurope. eu
22 Sobjak, Anita. Is Moldova Tired of Being the Success Story of the Eastern Partnership? Policy paper No. 20 
(68). July 2013. P. 2.
23 See, for example: Dyner, Anna Maria, Ryabova, Natalia. Belarus in the CES: Advantages and Disad­
vantages of Economic Integration. Policy paper No. 24 (72). August 2013.
24 Kaca, Elzbieta, Dudzinska, Kinga, Zubel, Karolina. A Competitive Two-Speed Policy: The Eastern Partner­
ship beyond 2013. Policy paper No. 27 (75). September 2013. Pp. 3-4.
25 Kaca, Elzbieta et al. A Competitive Two-Speed Policy: The Eastern Partnership beyond 2013.
26 See, for example: Zasztowt, Konrad. The Consequences of the Eurasian Integration of Kazakhstan for Its Eco­
nomic Relations with the EU. Bulletin No. 27 (360). 15 March 2012; Wnukowski, Damian. Poland's Export and Invest­
ment Opportunities in Kazakhstan. Bulletin No. 95 (548). 13 September 2013; Dyner, Anna Maria, Koscinski, Piotr. The 
Presidential Election in Venezuela: Will Russia and Belarus Lose an Ally? Bulletin No. 36 (489). 5 April 2013.
27 Makarychev, Andrey. Regionalism and Identities in the Common Neighbourhood: European and Russian 
Discourses. CEURUS EU-Russia Papers. No. 10. October 2013. P. 4.
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be more precise, the EaP vanguard, which is able to contribute to its transformation, creating the 
Visegrad Group's own political identity (“Central European mission”) and thus increasing their in­
fluence in the EU. Yet, Russia is seen as a constraint in the V4  eastern policy potential, though as 
such not easy to instrumentalize, due to her “smart bilateralism”28.
3. Conceptual approach to Russia's role in world politics and in ‘near abroad/  
‘common neighbourhood’
The key document which highlights the fundamentals of Poland's policy towards Russia 
is, of course, ‘Poland's Foreign Policy Priorities’ adopted in spring 201229. Here there are basi­
cally two aspects in Poland's policy towards Russia: as towards a great power and, separately, a 
player in ‘common neighbourhood’. When looking at the first one, one can reveal that Russia's 
role is presented as both destabilizing (increase in defence spending, while “Europe is going in 
the other direction”30), and opening up more space for Poland at the level of great powers and 
key international institutions' dialogue (“participation in mutual confidence building measures 
between the West and Russia,”31 including e. g. “W arsaw 's stressing its vision of EU Partner­
ship for Modernization”32 and at the same time contributing to EU-Russia visa regime liberali­
zation). In regard to the second aspect there appears less room for maneuver in relations with 
the Russian Federation -  there is only one way: cooperation with modernizing Russia while the 
EU accession prospect (and significant EU development assistance) is available for most of the 
‘neighbours’, first of all Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia33. Ukraine here is specified as a “strate­
gic partner”34 -  it resembles the term “priority partner” about this neighbouring country in the 
recent edition of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation35.
PISM experts definitely seek to address both aspects of their neighbour's policies. There 
is a growing trend in their activities and analyses to frame R ussia's role in the international sys­
tem as an “emerging power,” along with China and other BRIC countries, with the stress to de­
velop a trilateral cooperation format Germany -  Russia -  Poland36. This is one of the ways to 
deal with the increasing multipolarity which, a widely shared assumption, is seen as a danger­
ous tendency. In regard to Russia's role in the neighbourhood the expert discourse has been 
developing approximately along the above mentioned lines, however, giving more nuanced pic­
ture and sometimes a hint to new solutions.
4. ‘Near abroad’/  ‘common neighbourhood’ as a security concern
The ‘common neighbourhood’ matter has an accentuated security dimension, especially 
visible in 2009-2011 -  then it was directly connected with Poland's anxieties about new NATO 
Strategic Concept37 and Russia-Ukraine gas supply crises. Here, how PISM experts put it, Po­
land attempts “to build a secure environment for the EU”38.
One can see two models of argument present -  ‘common neighbourhood’ as a space di­
vided between EU and Russian spheres (or zones) of influence and as a space of positive-sum- 
game cooperation. The former makes justified the Russian analysts' opinion voiced, for exam­
ple, by INSOR experts about a threat of “military power vacuum” on the post-Soviet space39.
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28 Kalan, Dariusz. East of Center: Can the Visegrad Group Speak in One Voice on Eastern Policy? Policy pa­
per No. 5 (53). February 2013. Pp. 1,7,8; Sobjak, Anita. Conclusions of the Polish V4 Presidency and the Challenges 
Beyond It. Bulletin No. 71 (524). 2 July 2013.
29 Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016. March 2012. Available at: www. msz. gov. pl
30 Ibid. P. 4.
31 Ibid. P. 6.
32 Ibid. P. 18.
33 See, for example: Ibid. P. 12.
34 Ibid. P. 18.
35 Kontsepsiya vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii. 12. 02. 2013. Available at: www. mid. ru
36 Gradzuik, Artur, Kugiel, Patryk (red.). Polska w wielobiegunowym swiece. Szanse i perspektywy rozwoju 
stosunkow Polski z glownymi mocarstwami wschodzancymi. Raport. Lipec 2012; Trialog project Deutschland-Polska- 
Rossija launched in 2013. Available at: www. pism. org. pl
37 See, for example: NATO Member States and the New Strategic Concept: An Overview. Report. May 2010. P. 5.
38 Eastern Partnership: A Strategy for 2011 and Beyond. Report. Warsaw, 2010. P. 5.
39 See, for example: Arkhitektura evroatlanticheskoi bezopasnosti / Ed. by I. Yu. Yurgens, A. A. Dynkin, V. G. 
Baranovsky. Moscow, 2009. P. 109; Sikorski, Tomasz. Strategic Vacuum in Central Asia -  a Case for European En­
gagement? Strategic File No. 15. April 2011.
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Poland, together with the Baltic states and some V4 countries, has been quite successful in in- 
strumentalizing R ussia's military moves and cooperation in the neighbourhood in promoting in 
NATO her vision of security40. The latter focuses on Russia's involvement in cooperation in the 
neighbourhood; it is mostly developed in joint analyses with participation of the Russian ex­
perts. For instance, in 2011 the Polish and Russian experts41 highlighted the room for coopera­
tion between the two countries in R ussia's joining EaP projects. The report includes some ideas 
of the Russian expert discourse: economic cooperation on the lines of the European Economic 
Area with the stress on Russia's comprehensive modernization. These are linked to a more se­
curity-oriented component comprising every country's “right to decide freely about joining alli­
ances” and “rejection of the idea of spheres of influence”42. In 2012 an international group of 
experts pointed to the need to overcome “emerging institutional divide” on the OSCE space call­
ing for positive involvement of the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Customs Un­
ion in multilateral cooperation43.
By and large, one can see less attention and anxiety about Russia in the neighbourhood in 
late 2011-2013 with a direct connection to security. This, in my opinion, is determined by four fac­
tors (in order of relevance) -  consolidation of the EU energy market with a few EaP countries 
joining the Energy Community, EU financial crisis, good results in promoting the Polish ‘hard se­
curity’ concerns in NATO and EU and a trend of the Russian-Polish rapprochement. The first one 
relieves, to a certain extent, Polish energy security-related concerns, though recently it is coupled 
with disappointment in Ukraine's and M oldova's performance in the Energy Community. The 
crisis in the European Union, on the one hand, made the Poles more inward-looking, concentrat­
ing on the successful EU reform,44 on the other -  the Polish economic ‘wonder’ attributed the 
country a higher profile among EU member-states. This, in turn, gives the Poles more confidence 
about their role in the European Union. The new, constructive, trend in the Russian-Polish rela­
tions after the tragic event of April 2010 adds to the positive dynamics, however, its impact is lim ­
ited -  the centuries-old mistrust and stereotypes and the pragmatic interest in ‘othering’ Russia in 
hard security and energy matters do not facilitate in achieving a substantial progress. At the same 
time the success in this area is perceived as an important Poland's asset also contributing to im­
provement of her image in Europe45. Yet, this is the area where Russia seems to be losing a possi­
bility of developing her soft power. Even a cursory comparison of the Centers of Dialogue and Un­
derstanding projects is not to Russia's advantage: the Polish Center has a definite and well 
thought-out research and educational exchange programme and a clear set of the research foci, 
unlike the Russian one demonstrating rather a broad interest in events promoting cooperation in 
the old-fashioned manner lacking the engaging component which was, for example, successfully 
applied along the lines of “new public diplomacy” in case of RIAC46.
5. The Eastern Partnership and Russia's soft power in ‘near abroad’
The Eastern Partnership is central in PISM experts' analyses, as well as official rhetoric 
concerning E U 's, and Poland's, role in the Eastern neighbourhood.
At first the Polish experts tended to consider EaP -  which, as is known, originated from 
the Polish-Swedish initiative- as the most promising instrument for the EU cooperation with 
Russia. Prospects of the ‘Partnership for Modernization’ initiated by the European Commission 
did not receive positive assessment47 and soon slipped from the analyses, though there are ref­
erences to it in the official discourse. To my mind, main reasons for this kind of approach are
40 See e. g.: Dyner, Anna Maria. The Russian-Belorussian “West 2013” Military Exercise: An Alliance against 
External Enemy? Bulletin No. 102 (555). 27 September 2013.
41 Mostly from MGIMO-University.
42 Eastern Partnership -  A New Momentum for the EU-Russia Relations. Report. Warsaw, 2010.
43 Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community. From Vision to Reality. IDEAS report. July
2012. IDEAS -  Initiative for the Development of a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community.
44 See a much resonated Poland's Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski's speech “Poland and the Future of 
the European Union”. Berlin, 28 November 2011. Available at: https://dgap. 
org/sites/default/files/event_downloads/radoslaw_sikorski_poland_and_the_future_of_the_eu_0. pdf
45 Gradzuik, Artur, Kugiel, Patryk (red.). Polska w wielobiegunowymswiece. S. 29.
46 Simons, Greg. Russian Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Structure, Means and Message. P. 19.
47 Cwiek-Karpowicz, Jaroslaw. EU-Russia Relations One Year After the Partnership for Modernization. Bulle­
tin No 61 (278). 7 June 2011; Idem and Formuszewicz, Ryszarda. Partnership on Modernization: the EU's New Initia­
tive Towards Russia. Bulletin No. 43 (119). 18 March 2010.
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that in such a format there is little room for special status for Russia (highlighted by such forms 
of cooperation as ‘common spaces’ or ‘partnership for modernization’) and at the same time 
much room for Poland's transformation experience which is considered her primary soft power 
instrument in ‘common neighbourhood’. Russia's projects were not considered successful, 
while her influence in the neighbourhood was rather framed as illegitimate due to her inclina­
tion to direct control. Russia's different policies were scrutinized in terms of her various foreign 
policy tools what lead to their certain securitization (e. g. civic nuclear capacities, the Russian 
Orthodox Church's activities on the post-Soviet space48).
With development of the Customs Union and EaP there appeared a more complex pic­
ture comprising now a number of elements of which it is important to highlight the two. On the 
one hand, the Polish experts keep appropriating the Western discourse picturing Russia as an 
extra-regional actor taking advantage of the EU weakness in terms of traditional power in order 
to control the region and continue the status quo which implies that Russia is unattractive to 
her neighbours49. On the other hand, in 2013, Russia appears at times as an actor more power­
ful than EU in the area which can best be defined as soft power, which means that the European 
Union is outplayed in the domain perceived as its own with such instruments, as free- 
movement-of-people regime, language, cultural and religious ties50.
As I see it, this is clearly the example when the context is especially relevant. In recent 
years ‘near abroad’/ ‘common neighbourhood’ countries have been experiencing influences and 
projects of both Russia and the EU. While at the outset it seemed to many that the choice is, in 
fact, obvious for EaP states (except Belarus) -  the EU-sponsored modernization path which 
opened up many important possibilities, now there are quite a few reservations about that. The 
feeling of at least most of the Eastern Partnership countries is best described by the British 
scholar Philip Hanson: they face the two rather unattractive options51. The 2012 and 2013 PISM 
analyses, primarily authored by Igor Lyubashenko who looks at EaP Eastern European states' 
internal affairs, render an important message: the countries at first deemed as the most promis­
ing, Ukraine and Moldova, do not demonstrate particular success in their approaching to the 
EU in terms of norms and legislature mainly due to the logics of their economic and political 
(first of all Ukraine's) post-Soviet development, and little here could be attributed to Russia's 
traditional power influence. Among such conditions one can name energy-intensive economies, 
outdated infrastructure in many areas which makes its renovation according to the EU stand­
ards very costly and also socially painful, oligarchic structures in Ukraine, unstable political 
process, etc. 52 Besides, the EU policy did not meet people's expectations about its anticipated 
positive results53. Against this background, integration with Russia looks less consuming and 
more understandable with the visa-free regime that proved its significance.
One can see that the two projects of region-building in CIS area -  promoted by Russia and 
the EU -  are based on a zero-sum-game principle, despite this country's distant future-oriented 
designs of the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union creating one space, as well as the European 
Union's talk that the Association Agreements (including DCFTAs) can hardly hamper the Cus­
toms U nion's activities and can bring only positive results. PISM analyses confirm this point, 
while also arguing that Russia's project in fact opens up more room for the EU influence -  in 
promoting modernization which the European Union, and Poland in particular, can more effec­
tively deal with54.
48 Cwiek-Karpowicz, Jaroslaw. Role of the Orthodox Church in Russian Foreign Policy. Bulletin No. 109 
(185). 9 August 2010.
49 Makarychev, Andrey. Soft Power, Regionalism and Common Neighbourhoods: Russia's Potential in a 
Competitive Environment // Bilge Strateji. Cilt 5. Sayi 8. Bahar 2013. Ss. 48-49.
50 See, for instance: Kaca, Elzbieta et al. A Competitive Two-Speed Policy: The Eastern Partnership beyond
2013. P. 2.
51 Contribution of Philip Hanson, associate fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, 
to the seminar "EU’s Relations with Eastern Neighbourhood". The Uppsala Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, 
15 October 2013.
52 See, for instance: Lyubashenko, Igor. Start of Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement between the Euro­
pean Union and Moldova. Bulletin No. 10 (343). 1 February 2012; Sobjak, Anita. Is Moldova Tired of Being the Success 
Story of the Eastern Partnership? Policy paper No. 20 (68). July 2013; Lyubashenko, Igor. Ukraine's first Year in the 
Energy Community: Restart Needed. Policy paper No. 28. April 2012.
53 Lyubashenko, Igor. Perception of European Integration in Ukraine. Bulletin 42 (375). 25 April 2012.
54 Dyner A. M., Ryabova N. Belarus in the CES: Advantages and Disadvantages of Economic Integration. Pol­
icy paper. August 2013.
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R ussia's policies in ‘near abroad’ are not often defined as ‘soft power’ in the policy anal­
yses in question -  in 2012-2013 there appeared a few mentions, however, there is a special 
study prepared for an influential German think-tank; earlier though they were also termed ‘pub­
lic diplomacy’. In Polish experts' view, Russia has a wide range of soft power tools: visa-free 
regime and CIS nationals' access to her labour market, language, cultural and religious (now 
with more positive interpretation) ties, debates about Eurasian integration and even vast energy 
resources55. Jaroslaw Cwiek-Karpowicz, a leading PISM expert on Russia, argues that there is a 
problem in their implementation, as they can only bring attraction and, therefore, results if 
Russia introduces serious internal reform making her model of political and socio-economic 
transformation appealing to her neighbours56.
Here the image of Russia as a “real soft power in the post-Soviet area” and the one of 
“modernizing Russia,” with which large-scale EU cooperation is possible, indeed coincide. One 
can reveal that such a scenario is not seen as a matter of the near future: there given no consid­
eration to what is to be done with the two integration projects in the neighbourhood in this 
case -  it is somehow implied that all the disputes will be automatically resolved.
Yet, there has recently been voiced a practical present-oriented solution, obviously, 
prompted by the Russian trade restrictions towards Ukraine in August 2013. PISM expert, Ievgen 
Borobiev, suggested that the EU part in eventual similar cases should be an institutional arrange­
ment dealing with DCFTA-related disputes with the countries of the Common Economic Space. 
This, in turn, would result in “closer engagement with the Eurasian Economic Commission, until 
now shunned by the EU”57. Thus, it would mean that both projects come into contact -  it includes 
also that Russia recognizes the EU as a region-building player in the CIS area.
Conclusions
This analysis confirms the argument voiced by a few scholars that competing region- 
building projects influence one another, and there is a correlation in their development. On the 
example of Russia's and E U 's projects in the CIS area, to my mind, it makes sense to talk about 
their co-building the region. And it is only logical to acknowledge this situation by, to a certain 
extent, connecting them e. g. on the lines suggested by the PISM expert. It would mean, of 
course, that both actors, Russia and the EU, would recognize the legitimacy of each other's pro­
jects in ‘near abroad/ ‘common neighbourhood’. Russia does not have the monopoly in the CIS 
region not only because of the E U 's and other actors' activities there, but also because her 
neighbours are not willing her to have it. But it is also important that most of them are not will­
ing that Russia goes away completely. This makes the Russian soft power politics in the region 
more successful than such a classical player in this field, as the EU would expect.
The Polish discourses about R ussia's role in the neighbourhood develop rather in the 
framework of (neo)realist thinking -  quite expectedly given the historical context of bilateral 
relations. They deal a lot with a significant ‘hard power’ on the border inclined to domination 
with her different foreign policy tools being applied to support her capabilities in this domain -  
it means, therefore, less sovereignty/security for her neighbours both in ‘common neighbour­
hood’ and the EU. There is a certain demand for such R ussia's role in Poland. At the same time 
one can see a trend of less securitization of particular factors and more look at possibilities of 
cooperation in recent years.
It is significant that ‘common neighbourhood’ and the EU success here is very important 
in terms of Poland's EU identity and, consequently, a possibility to have a say in the EU poli­
tics. Russia can rather hamper this. However, it might mean that Poland, in fact, would be more 
realistic than the EU as a whole and come up with more practical initiatives to have a solution 
that might be called a success.
In my opinion, it is advisable, also in connection with the previous points, for Russia to 
take into account how her actions in the CIS could be interpreted in Poland and also invest
55 Cwiek-Karpowicz, Jaroslaw. Limits to Russian Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Area. DGAPanalyse No. 8. Ju­
ly 2012; Kaca, Elzbieta et al. A Competitive Two-Speed Policy: The Eastern Partnership beyond 2013; Sobjak, Anita. Is 
Moldova Tired of Being the Success Story of the Eastern Partnership?
56 Cwiek-Karpowicz, Jaroslaw. Limits to Russian Soft Power in the Post-Soviet Area.
57 Borobiev, Ievgen. The Embargo that Never Was: How Should the EU Respond to Russia's “Message” to 
Ukraine? Bulletin No. 97 (550). 19 September 2013.
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m ore in  d evelo p in g  her p o ten tia l in  th e area  th at escap ed  secu ritiza tio n  in  regard  to  th e n e ig h ­
b o u rh o o d  -  p eo p le-to -p eop le  con tacts in  ed u catio n  an d  research . T h is w ill con trib u te  to  b o th  
R u s s ia 's  m od ern ization  an d  im p ro vem en t o f  h er im ag e on th e in tern atio n a l aren a.
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В статье рассматривается «мягкая сила» России в польских 
официальном и экспертном дискурсах. В фокусе внимания -  
Польша в связи с активным участием руководства этой страны в 
разработке политики ЕС в отношении ряда государств постсо­
ветского пространства, исторически сложившегося восприятия 
опасности с востока, а также тенденции российско-польского 
сближения последних лет. Автор приходит к выводу, что инве­
стиции России в развитие потенциала «мягкой силы» будут 
наиболее плодотворны в области, которая избежала секьюрити­
зации -  контакты между людьми в сфере образования и иссле­
дований.
Ключевые слова: Россия, «мягкая сила», ближнее зарубе­
жье, общее соседство, Польша, Европейский союз.
